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Abstract 
 The purpose of this two-part article is to examine the regulatory 
environment governing hearsay electronic evidence in South Africa – with 
a view to providing clear, practical suggestions for regulatory reform in the 
context of the South African Law Reform Commission's most recent 
Discussion Paper on electronic evidence.  
Technology has become an indispensable part of modern life. In 
particular, the Internet has facilitated new forms of business enterprise, 
and shifted basic communication norms. From a legal perspective, 
technology has presented several novel challenges for courts and legal 
practitioners to deal with – one of these key challenges relates to 
electronic evidence and in particular the application of the hearsay rules 
to the digital environment.  
The South African Law Reform Commission has identified the application 
of the hearsay rule as one of the core concerns with regard to electronic 
evidence, and certain academic analysis has revealed inefficiency in the 
current legal position which may involve multiple sources of law. 
Moreover, the Law Society of South Africa has stated that there is some 
confusion amongst members of the profession in relation to hearsay as it 
applies to electronic evidence. 
With the pervasive and burgeoning nature of technology, and with the 
Internet in mind, it is natural to assume that electronic evidence will be 
relevant in most forms of legal proceedings in future, and hearsay 
electronic evidence in particular will play an increasingly important role in 
years to come. 
Consequently, part one of this article will consider the key definitional 
concept in relation to electronic evidence – data messages - and examine 
whether the definition should be revised. In addition, part one of this article 
will answer two further critical questions posed by the South African Law 
Reform Commission in relation to data messages and hearsay evidence, 
namely: should a data message constitute hearsay? And, how should one 
distinguish between documentary evidence and real evidence in the 
context of data messages? 
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1 Introduction 
Technology has become an indispensable part of modern life.1 In particular, 
the Internet has facilitated new forms of business enterprise and shifted 
basic communication norms.2 With the proliferation3 of technology involved 
in day-to-day life, the only reasonable inference one can draw is that 
electronic evidence will play an increasingly important role in most forms of 
legal proceedings – both now and in the future.  
The pervasive and burgeoning nature of advancing technology has forced 
change to the administration of justice, and presented several novel 
challenges for courts and legal practitioners to deal with.4 According to the 
South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC), in this context: "the 
application of the hearsay rule is one of the core concerns with regard to 
electronic evidence".5  
Certain academic analysis has revealed inefficiency6 with the current legal 
position (which may involve multiple sources of law). Moreover, the Law 
Society of South Africa has stated that, in relation to hearsay electronic 
evidence and related principles, there is some confusion amongst members 
of the profession.7  
                                            
* Lee Swales. LLB (UKZN) LLM (Wits). Lecturer, School of Law, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal and Consultant Attorney Thomson Wilks Inc. E-mail: 
swalesl@ukzn.ac.za. A revised version of this paper was presented at a conference 
of the South African Association of Intellectual Property Law and Information 
Technology Law Teachers and Researchers hosted by Stellenbosch University on 
21-22 June 2017. This paper forms part of an ongoing PhD study. 
1  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 437; Papadopoulos 
and Snail Cyberlaw@SA III 1; Van der Merwe et al Information and Communications 
Technology Law 1.  
2  Delsheray Trust v ABSA Bank Limited 2014 JOL 32417 (WCC) para 18 where the 
court noted, "modern technological developments have brought about a revolution 
in the way that information, including legal information, is captured and 
disseminated"; Heroldt v Wills 2013 2 SA 530 (GSJ) para 8 where Willis J stated, 
"the pace of the march of technological progress has quickened to the extent that 
the social changes that result therefrom require high levels of skill". 
3  De Villiers (2) 2010 TSAR 723. 
4  Although not exhaustive, the primary challenges are: the ease of manipulation of 
electronic evidence, rapidly evolving technology, the fragility of the media, 
dependency on certain specific hardware and/or software, and the fact that data on 
networked environments is regarded as dynamic and volatile. For a further 
discussion of these issues, see SALRC Issue Paper 27 7-15; De Villiers (1) 2010 
TSAR 558; Watney 2009 JILT 3-4. 
5  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 13. 
6  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 66. 
7  LSSA 2015 https://tinyurl.com/m9vght3. 
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Consequently, in order to provide clear and practical suggestions, this two-
part article will review the applicable regulatory environment governing 
hearsay electronic evidence in South Africa,8 and conclude with 
suggestions for law reform in the context of recommendations put forward 
by the SALRC (while also considering selected foreign jurisdictions – those 
of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, where electronic 
evidence has had more time to mature and develop).9  
Part one of this article will consider the key definitional concept in relation to 
electronic evidence – data messages - and examine whether the definition 
should be revised.10 In addition, part-one of this article will answer two 
further critical questions posed by the SALRC in relation to data messages 
and hearsay evidence, namely: should a data message constitute 
hearsay?11 And, how should one distinguish between documentary 
evidence and real evidence in the context of data messages?12 
2 Data messages 
Computer- or machine-related evidence13 is often referred to as electronic14 
evidence, digital evidence,15 ESI evidence16 (electronically stored 
information), computer evidence,17 or ICT18 evidence. None of these terms 
exists in South African statute. Instead, the term data message19 is used.20 
South Africa drew this definition from the United Nations Commission on 
                                            
8 Hofman and de Jager "South Africa" 761-796. 
9  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 83-88. 
10  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 52-55 where Issue 3 is framed as: should the 
definition of data message be revised? 
11  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 62-67 where part of issue 6 is framed as: should a 
data message constitute hearsay within the meaning of section 3 of the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act? 
12  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 68-70 where part of issue 7 is framed as: should there 
be distinction between mechanically produced evidence without the intervention of 
the human mind and mechanically produced evidence with the intervention of the 
human mind?  
13  Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 462-463 where the admissibility requirements for 
electronic documents are discussed. 
14  Hofman and de Jager "South Africa" 761-796; Papadopoulos and Snail 
Cyberlaw@SA III 315. 
15  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 410. 
16  Papadopoulos and Snail Cyberlaw@SA III 315. 
17  The term used by van Zyl J in S v Ndiki 2007 2 ALL SA 185 (Ck) para 4. 
18  Van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 114-115. 
19  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 2- 45; Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of 
Evidence 843-847. 
20  More broadly, the term "data" is used, and is defined in the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 as "electronic representation of 
information of any form"; Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 843. 
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International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Commerce, 
1996 (Model Law, 1996).21 
The first introduction22 of the term data message23 to South African law was 
on 30 August 2002 with the promulgation of the Electronic Communications 
and Transactions Act (the ECT Act).24 
Interestingly, the promulgation of the proposed Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill25 in its current form will lead to the term data message 
having conflicting definitions. The current definition in the ECT Act reads as 
follows: 
'data message' means data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic 
means and includes-  
(a) voice, where the voice is used in an automated transaction; and  
(b) a stored record. 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill26 defines the term as: 
'data message' means data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic 
means, where any output of the data is in an intelligible form. 
According to section 61 of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill,27 the 
definition of data message28 contained within the ECT Act is not due to be 
                                            
21  UN 1996 http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf; 
SALRC Discussion Paper 131 27-45; UNCITRAL 2017 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model_
status.html, where the Secretariat lists member states that comply with the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce (1996) (hereafter Model Law, 1996). There are 67 States in a total of 143 
jurisdictions that have adopted it. South Africa is largely compliant: "except for the 
provisions on certification and electronic signatures". 
22  The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 followed the 
Computer Evidence Act 57 of 1983, which did not attempt to define electronic 
evidence – rather, it defined "information" as "any information expressed in or 
conveyed by letters, figures, characters, symbols, marks, perforations, patterns, 
pictures, diagrams, sounds or any other visible, audible or perceptible signals". 
23  SALRC Issue Paper 27 31-33; SALRC Discussion Paper 131 paras 52-55. 
24  Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (hereafter ECT Act). 
25  Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill B6-2017. 
26  The Draft Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, 2015 released for public comment 
(Gen N 878 in GG 39161 of 2 September 2015) used the same definition of data 
message as that now contained in the current Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill 
B6-2017. 
27  Section 61 Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill B6-2017 (read together with the 
appropriate Schedule) does not list the definition of data message in the ECT Act on 
the list of the repeal of laws. 
28  The Draft Electronic Communications and Transactions Amendment Bill 2012 (GN 
R888 in GG 35821of 26 October 2012), which proposed a further definition for data 
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repealed or amended. Although this is a minor oversight and of little practical 
effect, it should be corrected as soon as possible. That notwithstanding, the 
current definition of data message is not entirely satisfactory (whether in the 
ECT Act or the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill). It would benefit from 
an amendment along the following lines: 
'Data message' means information generated, sent, received or stored by 
electronic means. 
The definition29 above should survive short- to medium-term technological 
development, and is concise and detailed enough without including 
superfluous terms, or including conditions that do not apply to traditional 
evidence.30 It is also consistent with the proposals put forward by the 
SALRC31 where it recommends that: 
There is clearly concern around the inclusion of the term - voice, where the 
voice is used in an automated transaction - in the definition of data message, 
and there do not appear to be compelling reasons to retain the term in the 
definition. The SALRC therefore proposes that the term be deleted or 
amended. 
3 Hearsay electronic evidence: overview and context 
The South African law of evidence is not codified in one single statute.32 The 
Constitution,33 a variety of statutes,34 the common law,35 and applicable 
case law must be considered to form a view on whether potential evidence 
is admissible, and if it is admissible, a view on the weight it should be 
accorded. In general, South Africa takes an exclusionary36 approach to 
                                            
messages, appears to have been withdrawn, which is a positive development – the 
definition was verbose and unnecessarily complicated.  
29  See further the discussion of law reform proposals in the context of electronic 
evidence in Swales 2018 PELJ 17-25. 
30  For a detailed discussion on “data message” and this issue in general, see SALRC 
Discussion Paper 131 13, 52-55. 
31  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 52-55. It should be noted that the SALRC 
recommendations were made before any version of the Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill was available for comment. 
32  Bellengere et al Law of Evidence 4; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of 
Evidence 3rd ed 24-31; De Villiers (1) 2010 TSAR 559.  
33  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 27. 
34  Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965; Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; Law 
of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988; ECT Act; and where applicable, 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
35  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 26-27. 
36  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 438; Schwikkard and 
Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 411; Papadopoulos and Snail 
Cyberlaw@SA III 317; Van der Merwe et al Information and Communications 
Technology Law 107; Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 761; Watney 2009 JILT 
5-11. 
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evidence in civil and criminal proceedings - this position mimics the English 
common law.37 
Evidence will be considered admissible only if it is relevant to a fact at 
issue,38 and even if relevant, the evidence will be admissible only if it is not 
excluded by a common law or statutory rule precluding the admissibility of 
a certain type39 of evidence, or precluding the admissibility of evidence 
obtained in a certain manner.40 
Any potential evidence that a party to civil or criminal proceedings wishes to 
admit to court will typically be classified under one or more of three 
headings: as an object (real evidence),41 as a document (documentary 
evidence),42 or evidence from a witness (oral evidence).43  
South African courts are not yet equipped to deal with the variety of 
computer systems and programmes that produce data messages. 
Therefore, for practical reasons a data message is normally presented as a 
print-out when tendering the information as evidence.44  
The key questions that arise are as follows: is a data message hearsay 
within the meaning of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act?45 Moreover, if 
a data message is hearsay within the meaning of the Law of Evidence 
                                            
37  S v Ndiki 2008 2 SACR 252 (Ck) para 21 where the common law position with regard 
to evidence is stated as follows: "evidence tending to prove or disprove an allegation 
which is in issue is admissible unless a specific ground for exclusion operates." Also 
see R v Trupedo 1920 AD 58 62; R v Katz 1946 AD 71 78; Hofman and De Jager 
"South Africa" 761; Papadopoulos and Snail Cyberlaw@SA III 316. 
38  R v Trupedo 1920 AD 58 62; S v Ndiki 2008 2 SACR 252 (Ck) para 21. 
39  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 287-304; Zeffertt and 
Paizes South African Law of Evidence 385-441; Bellengere et al Law of Evidence 
234-245. 
40  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 198-283; Zeffertt and 
Paizes South African Law of Evidence 721-736; S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 
August 2015) para 14.  
41  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 421-430; Schwikkard 
and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 395-402; Bellengere et al Law of 
Evidence 64-69; Zeffertt, Paizes and Skeen South African Law of Evidence 703-712. 
42  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 431-436; Schwikkard 
and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 404-409; Bellengere et al Law of 
Evidence 59-63; Zeffertt, Paizes and Skeen South African Law of Evidence 685-695. 
43  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 387-420; Schwikkard 
and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 361-394; Bellengere et al Law of 
Evidence 51-58. 
44  S v Ndiki 2008 2 SACR 252 (Ck); LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises 
v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA 
Consortium & Vending CC t/a La Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ). This observation 
also accords with my own personal experience in practice.  
45  These questions are based on SALRC Discussion Paper 131 52-71.  
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Amendment Act, then to what extent, if any, does the ECT Act "liberate"46 
the data message from the exclusionary hearsay rule? Further, and 
irrespective of whether a data message can be hearsay, how does one 
consistently determine whether a data message is documentary evidence 
or real evidence?47  
Increasingly, parties to criminal and/or civil proceedings rely on some form 
of data messages as evidence, and the rules relating to hearsay are often 
at issue. It is not always cost-effective or reasonable to have every person 
testify, and the precise classification of a data message, together with its 
statutory exceptions, becomes increasingly important in modern legal 
proceedings.  
4 Development of the legal position regulating hearsay 
electronic evidence  
The promulgation of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act48 took place in 
October 1988. It rendered the common law definition of hearsay49 
obsolete.50 Section 3 (which deals with hearsay evidence) reads as follows: 
3(1) Subject to the provisions of any other law, hearsay evidence shall not 
be admitted as evidence at criminal or civil proceedings, unless-  
(a)  each party against whom the evidence is to be adduced agrees to the 
admission thereof as evidence at such proceedings;  
(b) the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence 
depends, himself testifies at such proceedings; or 
(c) the court, having regard to- 
                                            
46  Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 432. 
47  S v Ndiki 2008 2 SACR 252 (Ck); LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises 
v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA 
Consortium & Vending CC t/a La Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ); Ex parte Rosch 
1998 1 All SA 319 (W); S v Mashiyi 2002 2 SACR 387 (Tk); Ndlovu v Minister of 
Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W); S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 
August 2015). Also see Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 431-436; 
Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 776-780; Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 464 (in 
particular note 9), 474 (in particular note 31); Fourie Using Social Media as Evidence 
8-20. 
48  Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
49  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 287-304; Zeffertt and 
Paizes South African Law of Evidence 385-443. 
50  S v Ndiki 2008 2 SACR 252 (Ck) para 31; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles 
of Evidence 3rd ed 269; Bellengere et al Law of Evidence 293-294; Zeffertt, Paizes 
and Skeen South African Law of Evidence 364-402; Zeffertt and Paizes South 
African Law of Evidence 389-416. 
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(i)  the nature of the proceedings; 
(ii)  the nature of the evidence; 
(iii)  the purpose for which the evidence is tendered; 
(iv) the probative value of the evidence; 
(v) the reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose 
credibility the probative value of such evidence depends; 
(vi) any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might 
entail; and 
(vii) any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into 
account, is of the opinion that such evidence should be admitted in the 
interests of justice. 
Importantly, section 3(4) defines hearsay as: 
evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends 
upon the credibility of any person other than the person giving such evidence  
The above definition of hearsay applies to both civil and criminal matters.51 
Interestingly, as noted by Schwikkard and Van der Merwe52 (referring also 
to Zeffert, Paizes and Skeen)53 there may be some debate insofar as the 
interpretation of the word “depends” in the definition above is concerned. 
The nuance or issue of interpretation is this: when applying the above 
definition (to any form of evidence, electronic included), does the word 
“depends” mean that the probative value of the evidence depends entirely 
on another person? Or only partially? In my view, the answer lies 
somewhere between the two.54 
As suggested by Zeffert and Paizes,55 the preferred interpretation must be 
that the probative value of the evidence depends substantially, primarily or 
sufficiently upon the credibility of any person other than the person giving 
evidence. An analysis of hearsay-related cases decided before the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act was promulgated, going back as far as 1837, 
                                            
51  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 770. 
52  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 275 (particularly para 
13.4); Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 293-294. 
53  Zeffertt, Paizes and Skeen South African Law of Evidence 364-402; also see the 
newer version of this text, Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 389-
391. 
54 A view endorsed in Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 390-391, 
where the authors state: "a case may be made for reading the words as meaning 
depends substantially or primarily upon". 
55  Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 390-391; Schwikkard and Van 
der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 293-294. 
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informs the above view.56 Be that as it may, the statutory definition of 
hearsay above will be the point of departure57 when determining whether a 
data message constitutes hearsay evidence.  
5 Can electronic evidence constitute hearsay?  
It would seem at first blush that if electronic evidence were to be exempt 
from the rules regulating hearsay, the net effect of this approach would be 
to favour electronic evidence over other forms of evidence. This could lead 
to forum or format shopping58 and would undoubtedly abolish any form of 
functional equivalence.59 Ideally, any form of electronic evidence must be 
treated the same as traditional evidence – the functional equivalent as far 
as possible. 
In terms of an approach that is consistent with functional equivalence, the 
United Nations60 states that it is: 
… based on an analysis of the purposes and functions of the traditional paper-
based requirement with a view to determining how those purposes or 
functions could be fulfilled through electronic-commerce techniques. 
At its core, a functional equivalent approach seeks to provide or facilitate an 
electronic equivalent for written, signed and original documents.61 Put 
differently, functional equivalence is: 
… an examination of the function fulfilled by traditional form requirements and 
a determination as to how the same function could be transposed, 
reproduced, or imitated in a dematerialized environment.62  
The ECT Act facilitates this approach in South Africa63 by recognising data 
messages as the functional equivalent of paper.64 A functional equivalent 
approach has been endorsed by South Africa's judiciary.65  
                                            
56  Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 390, in particular notes 24-28 
thereof where inter alia, Wright v Doe Tatha (1837) 7 AD & E 313, R v Teper [1952] 
AC 480, S v Van Niekerk 1964 1 SA 729 (C) and other cases are discussed. 
57  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) para 31. 
58  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 766. 
59  Hofman 2006 SACJ 257. 
60  UN 1996 http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf 
para 16. 
61  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 57; Hofman 2006 SACJ 260. 
62  Faria 2004 SA Merc LJ 531. 
63  Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 465. 
64  Mupangavanhu 2016 SALJ 859; Snail 2008 JILT 4. 
65  S v Miller 2016 1 SACR 251 (WCC) para 52; LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
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Prior to the promulgation of the ECT Act, some early decisions66 favoured a 
position which suggested that electronic evidence could not constitute 
hearsay as it was produced by a machine, and therefore its probative value 
did not depend on a person.  
In Narlis v South African Bank of Athens (Narlis),67 the key finding was that, 
for the purposes of the legislation governing the legal position at the time: 
"a computer, perhaps fortunately, is not a person". This decision provided 
the grounding for several other decisions with the result that, often, 
computer-based evidence was not admissible under the then applicable 
statutory provisions.68 
In S v Harper,69 the court considered whether a computer could be classified 
as a document in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act. It ultimately found 
that a computer could not be a document, and held that: 
Computers do record and store information but they do a great deal else; inter 
alia, they sort and collate information and make adjustments… The extended 
definition of 'document' is clearly not wide enough to cover a computer, at any 
rate where the operations carried out by it are more than the mere storage or 
recording of information.70 
However, the court did note that a print-out by a computer could be a 
document for the purposes of the Criminal Procedure Act, and held that: 
It seems to me, therefore, that it is correct to interpret the word ‘document’ in 
its ordinary grammatical sense, and that once one does so the computer print-
outs themselves are admissible.71 
As noted by the court in Ndiki,72 the Harper judgment has been 
misunderstood to some extent. The ratio above, as the law was then, was 
authority for the proposition that evidence on a computer (on computer 
                                            
v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a La Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 12-13; 
Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165; also see the court's 
analysis in one of the seminal cases involving electronic evidence, S v Ndiki 2007 2 
A ll 185 (Ck), where although the term is not specifically used, the analysis performed 
by the court (see para 53) uses similar logic; SALRC Discussion Paper 131 62; 
Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" para 764; Hofman 2006 SACJ 257. 
66  Mapoma Critical Study of the Authentication Requirements 20-26 for a perspective 
on the legal position governing electronic evidence in the 1990s. 
67  Narlis v South African Bank of Athens 1976 2 SA 573 (A); Van der Merwe et al 
Information and Communications Technology Law 111; Watney 2009 JILT 3-4. 
68  Takombe 2014 De Rebus 34. 
69  S v Harper 1981 1 SA 88 (D). 
70  S v Harper 1981 1 SA 88 (D) 259. 
71  S v Harper 1981 1 SA 88 (D) 259. 
72  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) paras 16-18, where Van Zyl J clearly and logically 
summarises the S v Harper judgment. 
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storage) would not be covered by the exception in the Criminal Procedure 
Act. However, if the information were reduced to a print-out, the evidence 
(as long as it met the statutory requirements in the Criminal Procedure Act) 
could be regarded as a document, and therefore admissible.  
Moreover, in Ex Parte Rosch73 the court ultimately found that the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act was not applicable to computer printouts 
because, on a basis similar to the rationale in Narlis, the court found that a 
computer was not a person. It held that: 
The provisions of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act regarding hearsay 
evidence were not applicable as the computer was not a 'person'.74 
Further, in S v Mashiyi,75 another case based on the rationale of the Narlis 
matter, the court found that it was unable in terms of the prevailing law at 
the time to admit documents which contained information that had been 
processed and generated by a computer.76 It reached this decision on the 
grounds that a computer is not a person, and therefore evidence produced 
by a computer could not depend on the probative value of a person. This 
authority, although of little consequence today (decided pre the ECT Act), 
is doubtful.77 
In Ndiki78 the court rejected the reasoning above and stated as follows: 
Cutting away the frills, the suggested approach, based on the aforegoing 
decisions [Narlis, Ex Parte Rosch and Mashiyi], is that a computer is not a 
person and if it carried out active functions, over and above the mere storage 
of information, the disputed documents are inadmissible. For the same reason 
the Law of Evidence Amendment Act relating to hearsay evidence is also of 
no assistance because hearsay evidence only extends to oral or written 
statements, the probative value of which depends upon the credibility of a 
"person". As I would indicate hereinunder, such an approach to computer 
generated evidence is in my view incorrect and of very little assistance. (My 
emphasis).  
                                            
73  Ex parte Rosch 1998 1 All SA 319 (W). 
74  Ex parte Rosch 1998 1 All SA 319 (W) 321.  
75  S v Mashiyi 2002 2 SACR 387 (Tk). 
76  S v Mashiyi 2002 2 SACR 387 (Tk) 390-391. 
77  Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 432, particularly fn 313; De Villiers 
(1) 2010 TSAR 563, where the author notes he cannot support the finding in Mashiyi 
and criticizes the judgment on the basis that the common law of evidence was 
overlooked, and states as follows: "Where there was or is no provision in legislation, 
or where the documents do not comply with statutory requirements, the common law 
of evidence could still have been used in order to get documents (also in the form of 
computer print-outs) admitted."  
78  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) paras 11-12. 
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A misunderstanding79 of technology, and the nature of a computer and its 
applications most likely led to these early approaches. The primary position 
adopted by Van Zyl J in Ndiki (and his rejection of the logic above) should 
be endorsed and followed in subsequent decisions. It is a pragmatic and 
common sense approach which also aligns itself with international best 
practice.80  
As noted elsewhere,81 the view that a computer is not a person (and 
therefore that its probative value does not depend on a person) misses the 
point that at some stage in its genesis all computers (and data messages) 
rely on the credibility of some person to design82, activate,83 programme, 
enable, disable etcetera the computer or automated system. Moreover, this 
view arguably doesn't take account of South Africa's position on evidence 
in general – that is, the distinction between real and documentary evidence, 
where an object should be admissible in any event (subject to its being 
relevant). 
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act notwithstanding, section 15 of the 
ECT Act provides for the admissibility of electronic evidence. This section 
has had a "huge impact"84 on evidence. Section 15 (1) reads as follows: 
15. Admissibility and evidential weight of data messages  
(1) In any legal proceedings, the rules of evidence must not be applied so  
as to deny the admissibility of a data message, in evidence-  
(a) on the mere grounds that it is constituted by a data message; or  
(b) if it is the best evidence that the person adducing it could reasonably 
be expected to obtain, on the grounds that it is not in its original form.  
Early academic views85 on this section favoured an interpretation86 that 
would exempt electronic evidence from the rules regulating hearsay 
                                            
79  Fourie Using Social Media as Evidence 31. 
80  Van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 130, where 
the authors praise the Judgment in Ndiki. See Swales 2018 PELJ 9-17 for an 
analysis of the situation in selected foreign jurisdictions. 
81  Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 433. 
82  Fourie Using Social Media as Evidence 31-32. 
83  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 68-69. 
84  De Villiers (2) 2010 TSAR 731. 
85  Collier 2005 JBL 6; Hofman 2006 SACJ 262. 
86  Collier 2005 JBL 6; although this interpretation appears to have been retracted by 
Collier herself in Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 414-
415, particularly fn 42-43 thereof. The chapter dealing with electronic evidence in the 
latest version of this text, Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th 
ed, is written by a different author and this early view is not canvassed in any detail. 
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altogether, with a court being primarily focused on assessing the weight87 
of the electronic evidence and simply admitting all forms of electronic 
evidence. Both the courts and other academics have rejected88 this position. 
Consequently, since this early debate on the import and meaning of section 
15 of the ECT Act, there is acceptance89 that data messages are not exempt 
from the rules regulating hearsay.  
In Ndlovu the court held that "there is no reason to suppose that section 15 
seeks to override the normal rules applying to hearsay evidence."90 It further 
noted that the "the rules relating to hearsay evidence have not been 
excluded entirely by section 15(1)."91 Finally, the court expressed the 
opinion that if a data message were to be rendered admissible in all 
circumstances "without further ado", then that position would clearly 
"elevate"92 data messages above traditional forms of evidence. 
In support of Ndlovu, Bozalek J in S v Brown93 (Brown) held: 
I agree with the observation of Gautschi AJ [in Ndlovu] that sec 15(1)(a) does 
not render a data message admissible without further ado. The provisions of 
sec 15 certainly do not exclude our common law of evidence. 
Furthermore, in Ndiki94 the court held: 
The definition of hearsay quite clearly extends to documentary evidence. 
Whether or not the evidence contained in the document can be said to depend 
upon the credibility of a person, is a factual question that must in turn be 
determined from the facts and circumstances of each case… where the 
                                            
87  Bellengere et al Law of Evidence 76.  
88  S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 August 2015) para 16; Ndlovu v Minister of 
Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W) 172; LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a 
LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) 
Ltd v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a La Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 
19; Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 474-775; Watney 2009 JILT para 3.1.4; Pistorius 
2002 SA Merc LJ 737-738. 
89  LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 19; Hofman 2006 SACJ 262; 
Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 474-475; S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) para 31; 
Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 432-435; Schwikkard and Van 
der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 441-446. 
90  Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W) 172-173. 
91  Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W) 172-173; Hofman 
and De Jager "South Africa" 767-768. 
92  Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W) 173. 
93  S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 August 2015) para 18. 
94  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) para 31. 
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probative value of a statement in the print-out is dependent upon the 
"credibility" of the computer itself, section 3 will not apply. 
Moreover, in LA Consortium95 the court held: 
The principle of 'functional equivalence' does not free data messages from the 
normal structures of the law of evidence... 
In summation: can a data message constitute hearsay within the meaning 
of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act? In short, yes. Simply put, section 
15 of the ECT Act does not override the normal rules applying to hearsay 
insofar as data messages are concerned.96 Moreover, the ECT Act ensures 
that data messages are functional equivalents of paper.97 Consequently, 
except where specific exceptions are made, then the normal common law 
pertaining to hearsay and admissibility applies equally to documentary 
hearsay as it does to electronic hearsay.98  
Finally, the provisions of section 15 of the ECT Act do not free data 
messages from the exclusionary hearsay rules – if the credibility of the data 
message depends upon a natural person. Conversely, if a data message's 
credibility depends substantially upon a computer,99 (for example, GPS data 
or mobile phone call records) then that evidence should be regarded as 
real100 in nature and should not be subject to a hearsay enquiry.101  
                                            
95  La Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 13. 
96  S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 August 2015) para 18; Ndlovu v Minister of 
Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W) 172-173; S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 
(Ck) para 31; LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service 
Provider (Pty) Ltd In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA Consortium & Vending 
CC t/a LA Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 13; Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 
474-475; Watney 2009 JILT 8-9; Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 776-777; 
Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 432-435; Schwikkard and Van 
der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 415. 
97  Papadopoulos and Snail Cyberlaw@SA III 322. 
98  Van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 130; Hofman 
and De Jager "South Africa" 766. 
99  Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 474, in particular fn 31. 
100  Lochner, Benson and Horne 2012 Acta Criminologica 77. 
101  Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W) 171-173; S v Ndiki 
2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) para 31; LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v 
MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA 
Consortium & Vending CC t/a La Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 13.  
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6 How does one consistently determine whether a data 
message is documentary evidence or real evidence? 
Real evidence102 consists of objects (things) – tangible items – that are in 
and of themselves evidence, and are available for inspection by the court – 
for example, a gun, a bullet or a knife.103 As noted in S v M:104 
Real evidence is an object which, upon proper identification, becomes, of 
itself, evidence (such as a knife, photograph, voice recording, letter or even 
the appearance of a witness in the witness-box). 
Real evidence105 is not subject to exclusion106 if relevant (and if no other 
statutory exception excludes it)107 and it is not subject to the hearsay rules108 
for the simple reason that it is what it purports to be. However, real evidence 
(traditionally, in any event) is typically meaningful only when supplemented 
by witness testimony – ie: someone who explains its relevance.109 
Consequently, as real evidence a data message would not need to be 
admitted to court under one of the various hearsay exceptions,110 and 
technically is evidence in and of itself to which a court must accord 
appropriate weight (even without oral testimony – although, without oral 
testimony the evidence is likely to have little evidentiary weight). Therefore, 
if evidence is real in nature, it is not conceptually correct to subject that 
evidence to a hearsay enquiry.  
In terms of documentary evidence, and the narrow Civil Proceedings 
Evidence Act111(CPEA) definition of document notwithstanding, our courts 
                                            
102  Mason and Seng "Real Evidence" 39 define real evidence as "material objects other 
than documents, produced for inspection of the court" relying on Malek Phipson on 
Evidence paras 1-14. Also see Mason and Seng "Real Evidence" 36-69. 
103  Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 849; Schwikkard and Van der 
Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 395-396; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe 
Principles of Evidence 4th ed 421. 
104  S v M 2002 2 SACR 411 (SCA) para 31. 
105  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 35-37. 
106  Hofman 2006 SACJ 268. 
107  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 776.  
108  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 776; S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) para 31; 
Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W) 173. 
109  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 395; Zeffertt and 
Paizes South African Law of Evidence 849; Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 
776-779; Van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 
124-130. 
110  Swales 2018 PELJ 2-9; see also Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of 
Evidence 4th ed 310-323. 
111  Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 (the CPEA). 
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have taken differing views on the meaning of the word document112 and 
have grappled with how best to classify electronic types of evidence.113  
This inconsistency in approach is particularly problematic in the context of 
electronic evidence where the classification of evidence (ie: real or 
documentary) is an important consideration114 in determining the evidentiary 
rules applicable. For example, in the case of Seccombe v Attorney-
General115 it was held that the word document is: 
a very wide term and includes everything that contains the written or pictorial 
proof of something. It does not matter of what material it is made…116 
This definition suggests that a data message could be included in the 
definition of document.117 Conversely, however, in S v Mpumlo118 the court 
found that video evidence is not a document, and classified the evidence as 
real evidence119 by finding that: 
I have no doubt that a video film, like a tape recording, is real evidence, as 
distinct from documentary evidence, and, provided it is relevant, it may be 
produced as admissible evidence, subject of course to any dispute that may 
arise either as to its authenticity or the interpretation thereof.120 
On the logic followed by the court in Mpumlo, data messages can also be 
treated as real evidence.  The court must, however, be satisfied regarding 
the relevance of the evidence, and its admissibility will be subject to any 
dispute regarding authenticity.  
In S v Baleka (1)121 the court agreed with the approach in Mpumlo above, 
but only insofar as the video aspect of the evidence is concerned (leaving 
                                            
112  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 313-315. 
113  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck); LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises 
v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA 
Consortium & Vending CC t/a La Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ); Ex parte Rosch 
1998 1 All SA 319 (W); S v Mashiyi 2002 2 SACR 387 (Tk); Ndlovu v Minister of 
Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W); S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 
August 2015). 
114  Fourie Using Social Media as Evidence 8-16. 
115  Seccombe v Attorney-General 1919 TPD 270.  
116  Seccombe v Attorney-General 1919 TPD 270 277; S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 
(17 August 2015) para 19; Hofman 2006 SACJ 268. 
117  De Villiers (1) 2010 TSAR 564-572. 
118  S v Mpumlo 1986 4 All SA 197 (E); Fourie Using Social Media as Evidence 8-16; 
Van Tonder The Admissibility and Evidential Weight of Electronic Evidence paras 
16-18. 
119  Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 854 where this decision is 
criticised. 
120  S v Mpumlo 1986 4 All SA 197 (E) 202. 
121  S v Baleka (1) 1986 4 SA 192 (T). 
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the categorisation and question of the audio aspect open). Van Dijkhorst 
J122 held as follows: 
I agree with the conclusion of Mullins J (in Mpumlo) that a video tape is real 
evidence. 
However, in S v Ramgobin123 the court took the opposite view to Mpumlo 
and found that video evidence is indeed documentary. This view guards 
against the possibility of doctored or edited evidence’s being admissible. 
There is strong support for this decision by the widely quoted academic 
author Zeffert.124 
In S v Baleka (3)125 the court had occasion to consider Ramgobin, and 
rejected this approach and stated: 
I deal with tape recordings as I would deal with any other type of real evidence 
tendered where its admissibility is disputed. The test is whether it is relevant. 
It will be relevant if it has probative value. It will only have probative value if it 
is linked to the issues to be decided.126  
Importantly, in S v Nieuwoudt127 and S v Fuhri,128 two appeal matters, it was 
held that the approach in Baleka (3) was preferable.  
Insofar as technology is concerned, one may ask: how can these decisions 
be interpreted in the context of data messages? On the one hand, the only 
hurdle to admissibility is relevance (if the data message is classified as real 
evidence); but on the other, in addition to relevance the data message must 
also be an accurate representation of the information.  
Based on the logic in Baleka (3), and those cases that support it, the 
classification of a data message as real evidence will mean that if a court 
determines that the data message is relevant, the evidence is admissible. 
On this logic and rationale, the enquiry about authenticity and accuracy will 
be central when a court accords the evidence weight, rather than when a 
court considers its admissibility.  
However, in S v Koralev,129 a child pornography matter involving data 
messages in the form of digital photographs, the court noted, "because of 
                                            
122  S v Baleka (1) 1986 4 SA 192 (T) 433. 
123  S v Ramgobin 1986 4 SA 117 (N). 
124  Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 855-857. 
125  S v Baleka (3) 1986 4 SA 1005 (T). 
126  S v Baleka (3) 1986 4 SA 1005 (T) 1026. 
127  S v Nieuwoudt 1990 4 SA 217 (A). 
128  S v Fuhri 1994 2 SACR 829 (A) 835. 
129  S v Koraley 2006 2 SACR 298 (N). 
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modern technology, it is essential for evidence in relation to such images to 
be approached with extreme caution."130 The court endorsed the approach 
in Baleka (3), but in effect what it did was introduce a modified version of 
the rationale in Ramgobin131 by finding that in order for it to be admissible, 
real evidence must not only be relevant but also accurate (with some form 
of corroboration as to the accuracy of the image). The court held: 
Before the images in question could be admissible in evidence against the 
appellants there had to be some proof of their accuracy in the form of 
corroboration that the events depicted therein actually occurred.132 
Consequently, before the digital images could be admissible, the court 
found that there had to be some proof of their accuracy in the form of 
corroboration – for example, a photographer or some other witness would 
have to testify as to the veracity of the images.  
As noted by Hofman,133 it is possible to adopt the interpretation taken in 
these video and audio admissibility cases to data messages. Therefore, if 
one prefers the approach in the KwaZulu-Natal cases134 illustrated by 
Ramgobin, and to an extent by Koralev, then a data message that relies on 
the credibility of a computer would be admissible if it is relevant and 
authentic.  
Conversely, if one prefers the approaches taken in the Gauteng cases via 
Baleka (1) and Baleka (3) (and supported by Hefer JA in the two appeal 
decisions), then authenticity is not a pre-requisite for admissibility, and a 
data message that relies substantially on the credibility of a computer will 
be admissible if relevant.135 
Consequently, there is a strong argument in the context of data messages 
that where the credibility of the data message substantially depends on the 
credibility of a computer, application, machine or mechanical process, it is 
real evidence and needs only to be relevant to be admissible. Conversely, 
there is an equally strong argument to suggest that the data message must 
not only be relevant to be admissible, but must also be accurate (authentic).  
                                            
130  S v Koraley 2006 2 SACR 298 (N) 307. 
131  Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 852, where the authors also reach 
this conclusion.  
132  S v Koraley 2006 2 SACR 298 (N) 306-307. 
133  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 777-779. 
134  Also see S v Singh 1975 1 SA 330 (N). 
135  Motata v Nair 2009 1 SACR 263 (T) para 21, where the court summarises the various 
approaches. 
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In Motata v Nair136 the court weighed up the various approaches and held it 
was unnecessary to decide whether proof of authenticity is in fact a 
prerequisite for the admissibility of audio recordings. Consequently, the 
issue that is unclear is as follows: in order for a data message (which is real 
evidence) to be admissible, must it be accurate (authentic)? Alternatively, 
only relevant? 
Given the ease of manipulation137 of data messages, the production of some 
evidence to show the court that the data message is authentic (an accurate 
and reliable representation of the information) is probably desirable, but 
quite what that evidence is in each case will turn on the relevant facts and 
be at the discretion of each judicial officer.  
Authenticity as a pre-requisite for admissibility (in addition to relevance) is 
supported by: Koralev (which dealt specifically with data messages); widely 
quoted academics;138 Ramgobin; and is consistent with the most recent 
High Court judgment of LA Consortium139 (the Supreme Court of Appeal has 
not yet had occasion to consider this issue).  
Conversely, there appears to be equal justification for a court to accept data 
messages as evidence on the basis that they are relevant (when the 
evidence is real140 in nature) – and then to consider accuracy when 
determining weight. Indeed, it will be interesting to see which approach 
South Africa's decisive courts elect to take when (not if) this issue reaches 
the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
The above judicial debate notwithstanding, there is an argument that video, 
audio and graphics more closely resemble documentary rather than real 
evidence. Hofman141 states: 
                                            
136  Motata v Nair 2009 1 SACR 263 (T) para 21. 
137  Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 461; Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 
852-854. 
138  Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 852. 
139  LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) paras 12-13, where the court found that the 
evidence was both real and documentary. In so doing it applied a hearsay enquiry 
to admit the evidence and considered the authenticity and reliability of the evidence 
as key factors to be considered before admitting the evidence. 
140  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 35-36, where English barrister and author Mason 
states: "emerging jurisprudence, globally, seems to suggest that computer printouts 
may constitute real evidence". 
141  Hofman 2006 SACJ 268; S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 August 2015) para 19; 
Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 778. 
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video, audio and graphics now resemble documents more than the knife and 
bullet that are the traditional examples of real evidence  
Accordingly, some authors are of the view that graphics, audio and video in 
data message form should be classified as documentary evidence.142 This 
view was accepted by the Western Cape High Court in Brown,143 where the 
court had occasion to discuss how best to classify evidence as real or 
documentary. The decision in Ndiki144 was endorsed and the court found 
that the best approach is to consider the nature145 of the evidence, together 
with the reason for its admission. Furthermore, the court in Brown found that 
much like in Ndiki the transient and fluid nature of electronic 
communications meant that its admission into evidence is better suited as 
a document rather than as an object (real evidence).146  
With that being the case, in circumstances where it is not considered real in 
nature, in order to admissible147 an electronic communication in the form of 
a document must be: produced, original and authentic (subject to 
concessions provided in the ECT Act regarding originality and 
production).148 
As noted by Gautschi AJ:149 
For documentary evidence to be admissible, the statements contained in the 
document must be relevant and otherwise admissible; the authenticity of the 
document must be proved; and the original document must normally be 
produced. 
Therefore, the question of whether a data message is a document 
(documentary evidence) or an object (real evidence) can be pivotal in 
determining whether evidence is admissible or inadmissible (due to 
hearsay), and will further dictate the hurdles to be overcome in its reception 
to court. This issue can be controversial,150 and arguably requires law 
                                            
142  Hofman 2006 SACJ 268; Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 852.  
143  S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 August 2015) para 18. 
144  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) para 53. 
145  S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 August 2015) para 20. 
146  S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 August 2015) para 20. 
147  Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 461-480. 
148  Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 461-480; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of 
Evidence 4th ed 431-435. 
149  Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W) 165-166. 
150  Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 432-433, where the authors 
disagree with the proposition that a computer can produce real evidence and rely on 
Bilchitz "Law of Evidence" 796 to support their position. In my view, although 
understandable, this position is not consistent with modern international practice and 
does not accord with the South African common law in relation to real evidence. As 
a result, the proposition that computers cannot produce real evidence should be 
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reform151 - the SALRC have stated that it supports a distinction between 
documentary and real evidence (in the context of data messages).152  
In Ndlovu, Gautschi AJ found that data messages could be either real 
evidence or documentary evidence, depending on the nature of the 
evidence, by holding as follows: 
where the probative value of the evidence depends upon the ‘credibility’ of the 
computer… section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 will 
not apply153 
In Ndiki154 the court followed logic similar to that in Ndlovu by finding that a 
data message will be considered real evidence if its credibility depends on 
the reliability of a computer, by holding that: 
Evidence on the other hand that depends solely upon the reliability and 
accuracy of the computer itself and its operating systems or programmes, 
constitutes real evidence. 
However, the court in Ndiki did express reservations about the reliability of 
computer-based evidence and obiter expressed the view155 that all 
computer-based evidence should be hearsay.156 However, the court did not 
deem it necessary to finally determine this issue and left the question open. 
In LA Consortium Malan J supported the distinction created in both Ndlovu 
and Ndiki by finding that evidence in the form of computer printouts was real 
evidence by stating that: "this is real evidence the probative value of which 
                                            
rejected as appears to have been done with most recent case law in South Africa 
dealing with the issue; for example, S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck); Ndlovu v 
Minister of Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W) 173; LA Consortium & 
Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd In re: MTN Service 
Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 
(GSJ). 
151  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 68-70. 
152  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 85, where the SALRC notes that it "supports the 
maintenance of a distinction between automated data messages and data messages 
made by a person" and proposes statutory reform.  
153  Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W) 173. 
154  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) para 7. 
155  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) para 33; Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 777, 
where the reservations expressed in Ndiki are based on the misgivings noted in the 
annual survey of South African law by Bilchitz – Bilchitz "Law of Evidence" – where 
the view espoused is that all computer-based evidence is subject to the credibility of 
a natural person and should therefore be regarded as hearsay. This view should be 
rejected as it is inconsistent with recent case law, and with South Africa's common 
law on real evidence.  
156  This view is only obiter dictum, and Van Zyl J did not feel it necessary to decide this 
point. 
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depends on the reliability and accuracy of the computer and its operating 
systems."157 
The court went further, unfortunately, as noted elsewhere,158 to state that: 
"the data messages relied upon in this case are not only real evidence but 
includes hearsay." Perhaps the court meant to say there was both real 
evidence and documentary hearsay evidence (as was the case in Ndiki). 
The court appears to note that the probative value of the evidence depends 
on a computer, and is therefore real in nature,159 however the court 
ultimately concludes that the evidence is hearsay in nature (but does allow 
it as admissible via statutory hearsay exceptions). Arguably, this 
classification is problematic as conceptually, real evidence cannot be 
subjected to a hearsay analysis. If the evidence is real in nature, it is what 
it purports to be.  
In Brown Bozalek J took a conservative approach (although the court did 
endorse the decision in Ndiki), and found that even though the admissibility 
of photographs (stored via electronic means) were more akin to being real 
evidence, they were ultimately classified as documentary evidence. The 
court found that:  
Given the potential mutability and transient nature of images such as the 
images … I consider that they are more appropriately dealt with as 
documentary evidence rather than 'real evidence.'160  
Herein lies some of the controversy (or room for law reform). When should 
data messages be considered documentary evidence and when should they 
be considered real evidence? Finally, and to add a further nuance, is it 
possible for electronic evidence to be both real and documentary at the 
same time or, at the very least, exhibit characteristics of both real and 
documentary evidence? 
                                            
157  LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 16. 
158  LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v La Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 12; De Villiers (2) 2010 TSAR 733. 
159  LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 16. 
160  S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 August 2015) para 20. 
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In my view the solution is a relatively simple161 one: consider the nature162 
of the data message, and determine whether it relies on the credibility of a 
person or a machine.163 As noted in Ndiki: 
It is an issue that must be determined on the facts of each case having regard 
to what it is that the party concerned wishes to prove … the contents thereof, 
…the function performed by the computer and the requirements of the 
relevant section relied upon for the admission of the document in question.164 
It may be that a data message exhibits characteristics of both real and 
documentary evidence. This was the case in both Ndiki and LA Consortium, 
and in these cases the evidence that is classified as real should be treated 
as traditional forms of real evidence. Similarly, if the evidence is 
documentary in nature, it should be treated in that manner (and subject to 
hearsay considerations). 
Clearly, the distinction between whether a data message is real or 
documentary can be difficult to draw at times, but the apparent difficulty 
notwithstanding, that should not result in all data messages being treated 
as documentary evidence. This approach would be short-sighted and 
conceptually incorrect, and would ignore our common law. If the data 
message relies substantially on a computer or mechanical process, then 
that evidence should be real in nature. Equally, if a data message relies 
substantially on the credibility of a person, then that evidence must be 
treated as documentary hearsay. 
7 Conclusion 
Societies' increasing reliance on technology means that electronic evidence 
will become increasingly important. Ideally, any form of electronic evidence 
must be treated in the same way as traditional evidence – as the functional 
equivalent thereof. Accordingly, electronic evidence can certainly constitute 
hearsay within the meaning of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act. When 
dealing with electronic evidence, the classification thereof is critical in 
                                            
161  De Villiers (1) 2010 TSAR 568-569, where the author suggests a five-step approach. 
In my view, this is overly complicated. A court must concern itself primarily, with the 
nature of the evidence and then apply the normal common law rules applicable to 
that type of evidence. Also see Fourie Using Social Media as Evidence 13-14. In my 
view, the nature of the evidence must primarily dictate its classification. In this regard, 
see S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 August 2015) para 20; S v Ndiki 2007 2 All 
SA 185 (Ck) para 53; Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 461. 
162  S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 August 2015) para 20; S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 
185 (Ck) paras 20-21. 
163  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) paras 20-21; De Villiers (1) TSAR 2010 566-567; 
Fourie Using Social Media as Evidence 8-13. 
164  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) paras 20-21. 
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determining whether the evidence is admissible or not (due to hearsay), and 
the classification will further dictate the requirements to be satisfied when 
admitting the evidence to court. 
In order to consistently determine how to classify electronic evidence, it is 
imperative to consider the nature of the evidence.165 Moreover, one must 
consider what role the computer or mechanised process played in the 
genesis of the evidence concerned. Simply put, if the credibility of the 
evidence depends upon a person (human thoughts or observations 
recorded as a data message), then this evidence should be treated as 
documentary hearsay. Conversely, where the evidence depends 
substantially upon a computer (GPS records recorded as data messages, 
for example), then that evidence should be classified as real evidence. 
Finally, part two of this article will consider: the exceptions to the hearsay 
rules (applicable when electronic evidence is classified as documentary 
hearsay); a selected review of relevant foreign jurisdictions where South 
Africa may be able to learn lessons; and further law reform urgently required 
in relation to hearsay electronic evidence. 
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